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Methodology

How we compute landlord-risk scores across 32,000+ US cities, 3,100+ counties, and all 50 states plus DC - distilled from 23 mined factors through a percentile-normalized, power-law-calibrated model that is validated out-of-sample against real court outcomes. This is the live NGP-EvictStats-v12.2 model.

The model, fully expanded

L - legal floor (6) P - political (3) f - frequency (1) C - context (13→4) D - rarity dampener Score

The variables - every symbol in the equation

Legal floor  L = 0.34ρ + 0.26τ + 0.13ω + 0.12ε + 0.08κ + 0.07λ
Rent-control intensity
Strictness of local rent regulation (graded 1-5)
.34
Eviction timeline
Days filing→judgment at the county venue
.26
Tenant-organizing strength
Organized tenant bar / union density
.13
Process difficulty
Procedural hurdles to evict
.12
Housing-court lean
Bench disposition toward tenants
.08
Tenant-law probability
Modeled odds of new tenant-protective law
.07
Political  P = 0.40μ + 0.40δ + 0.20σ  ·  Frequency  f
Local political climate
City-level lean (so same-county cities differ)
.40
County presidential margin
2024 Dem margin in the trial county
.40
State political lean
Statewide partisan composite
.20
Eviction filing rate
Filings per 100 renter households (national percentile)
1.0
Context  C = ¼(ΞE + ΞM + ΞS + ΞD) · 13 factors → 4 constructs
bRent burden
%income to rent · E
1⁄13
vSevere burden
low-income paying 50%+ · E
1⁄13
pPoverty rate
SAIPE · E
1⁄13
kDebt in collections
Urban Institute · E
1⁄13
nSNAP enrollment
ACS · E
1⁄13
iLow median income
inverted ACS · E
1⁄13
aMarket tightness
inverted vacancy · M
1⁄13
gHome-price growth
FHFA HPI · M
1⁄13
qLow housing supply
inverted permits · M
1⁄13
hRenter share
ACS · S
1⁄13
uUnemployment
BLS LAUS · S
1⁄13
mHomelessness
HUD CoC · S
1⁄13
xClimate / disaster risk
FEMA NRI · D
1⁄13
23mined factors
31,828scored jurisdictions
0.76rank concordance vs court timelines
228verified rent-control jurisdictions

The reasoning, step by step

1

What we measure

The score is operating risk to an owner, not tenant hardship: if you must lawfully remove a non-paying tenant, how slow, costly and uncertain is it? That reframing puts dense, tenant-protective markets (Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, coastal New Jersey) at the ceiling and fast-eviction Sun-Belt markets (Houston, Phoenix) near the floor.

The target is deliberately operational rather than normative. Every input is selected for how it maps onto the time, cost and uncertainty of regaining possession through the courts – filing-to-judgment timelines, statutory notice and cure windows, the breadth of just-cause and rent-regulation regimes – not onto any judgment about whether those protections are good policy. The axis is therefore something we can anchor to realized, landlord-side outcomes instead of sentiment.

2

Normalization – rank, not raw

Every factor becomes a national percentile rank (x → Fn(x) ∈ [0,1]) before it enters the model. Percentile (rather than z-score) normalization is deliberately outlier-robust – serial-filing artifacts and heavy-tailed cost distributions cannot dominate.

Ranking each factor against the full national distribution of roughly 31,800 places means a value’s meaning is its position among peers, not its absolute magnitude, which puts incommensurable units – days, dollars, percentages, ordinal law strength – on one comparable scale. It also makes the pipeline stable under data revisions: when a new ACS vintage shifts a raw distribution, ranks move far less than levels, so year-over-year scores hold unless the underlying ordering actually changes.

3

The regulatory floor – a power-law tail

Legal, political and contextual percentiles combine into a normalized floor Φ = (0.64L + 0.18P + 0.18C)/Φmax, then pass through a convex transform 1 + 9·Φ1.35 that compresses the middle and stretches the tail, so only the most-protective markets approach 10.

The 0.64 / 0.18 / 0.18 split loads the floor onto codified law, with political lean and socioeconomic context as secondary modifiers, because statute is the most direct and durable determinant of eviction friction. The convex exponent is what prevents grade inflation at the top: it holds the broad middle of the country in a narrow band and reserves the 9–10 range for the handful of maximally-regulated markets, so the ceiling stays diagnostic rather than crowded.

4

The frequency-difficulty interaction

Eviction frequency enters as a multiplicative interaction 2.8·f·L·(1−Φ), not an additive term. It only compounds risk where eviction is also hard, and the (1−Φ) factor makes the lift vanish at the ceiling, so raw filing volume can never push a moderate market above a maximally-regulated one.

Treating frequency as an interaction rather than a main effect encodes a specific claim: high filing volume only raises owner risk where the legal process is also slow and costly, since permissive jurisdictions clear cases before they become expensive. The (1−Φ) term is a saturation guard – as a market approaches the regulatory ceiling the marginal lift from volume decays toward zero, which is why a high-churn but landlord-friendly market never outranks a tightly-regulated one on filing counts alone.

5

The rarity dampener & graded rent control

Where strong local rent control is absent, a multiplicative dampener D = 0.55 + 0.45·f sinks rare-eviction, free-market towns. Rent control is graded 1-5 from a registry of 228 verified jurisdictions and gated by a 31-state statutory preemption guard.

The dampener corrects a sampling artifact: in a small permissive market a near-zero filing rate reads as “safe” when it often just reflects thin counts, so D pulls those places toward the floor in proportion to how rare eviction genuinely is. Rent control is graded rather than flagged because a CPI-tied stabilization ordinance and a hard statutory cap are not the same instrument, and the preemption guard ensures a city in a state that legally bans rent control cannot accrue strength it has no authority to enact.

6

Collinearity control – honest dimensionality

A correlation audit showed the legal and political signals are highly collinear (|r| up to 0.96) and the socioeconomic block collapses onto a few latent constructs. We therefore reduce the 13 context factors to four orthogonal constructs (economic distress, market tightness, social pressure, disaster exposure) rather than double-count.

Carrying all thirteen raw factors would count the same signal under several names and inflate apparent precision, so we project them onto four decorrelated constructs that capture the independent variance without the redundancy. It is a deliberate trade of nominal factor count for honest degrees of freedom: fewer, orthogonal inputs keep the weights interpretable and stop any single underlying phenomenon from entering the score three times over.

7

Validation – backtested, not asserted

Weights are checked against ground truth the model never sees: realized county court outcomes and observed eviction timelines. The composite achieves a Spearman rank concordance of 0.76 with measured filing-to-judgment timelines; a ridge-regularized regression recovers factor importances out-of-sample, and a ±20% weight-perturbation test leaves the ranking stable (Spearman ≈ 0.97).

The 0.76 concordance is measured out-of-sample, against held-out timelines the weights were never fit on, so it reflects genuine predictive ordering rather than in-sample overfit. The perturbation test is a robustness probe rather than an accuracy claim: a rank correlation near 0.97 under random ±20% reweighting tells us the ranking is driven by the structure of the data, not by the exact coefficients – the property you want before publishing a leaderboard.

8

Reproducible, versioned architecture

Scores are computed once and served through a single versioned fact table behind an active-version pointer; every historical model version is retained and auditable, and a new release is an atomic pointer flip, never an in-place mutation of live data.

Each release writes a complete, immutable set of rows under its own version label, and going live is a single-row repoint of the active pointer – so rollback is instantaneous and no reader ever observes a half-rebuilt table. The same discipline keeps the fifty-year history auditable: any city’s score for any year traces back to the exact model version and the dated inputs that produced it, which is precisely what lets us correct a single statute’s effective date and recompute the series without disturbing the rest of the record.

Algorithm change history

The active version is shown at the top of this page. The score is published as a numbered model: every release is written to a single versioned history table under an active-version pointer, and no prior version is overwritten in place. The full record is below, newest first, each dated by when it was computed and described by the change that made it more accurate.

Underlying factor documentation

The sections below document the legacy nine-axis decomposition and full data lineage that feed the constructs above.

The 1-to-10 score

Each city carries a primary landlord-risk score on a 1-to-10 scale. The score is a national percentile ranking where 1 represents the most landlord-friendly markets (fast eviction process, low rent burden, conservative court culture, low organizing strength) and 10 represents the most tenant-protective (slow eviction process, severe rent burden, strong tenant defense infrastructure, active rent-control or just-cause regimes).

The score is computed as a weighted average of nine sub-factors plus a state-law multiplier. Sub-factors are themselves percentile ranks derived from underlying ACS and political data; the state-law multiplier captures statutory differences that produce structural differences in operator-side experience.

The nine sub-factors

1. Local political climate

Derived from 2020 county presidential margin, weighted to the city's specific census tract distribution where available. Higher Democratic margin produces higher score reflecting stronger structural support for tenant protections at the local level.

2. Regional political climate

Same 2020 presidential data computed at the surrounding multi-county metro level. Captures the broader political pressure environment that affects state legislative votes and regional court appointments.

3. State political climate

Statewide 2020 presidential margin and trifecta status (governor + both chambers same party). Single-party trifecta states produce predictable legislative dynamics; divided-government states produce stalemate that often locks in the status quo.

4. Economic stress

Composite of local poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median household income trajectory, all from ACS 2023 5-year estimates. Higher economic stress correlates with higher eviction filing rates.

5. Supply constraint

Derived from vacancy rate, building age distribution, and the ratio of renter-occupied to owner-occupied units. Tighter supply produces stronger rent growth, which translates into rent-burden pressure and elevated eviction filings.

6. Rent-control risk

Combines current rent-control coverage (city, county, and state ordinances) with the political-climate probability of new tenant-protective legislation in the next 12 to 24 months. Cities with active ballot campaigns or pending legislation score higher.

7. Eviction process difficulty

Captures the procedural framework: state filing fee, predicate-notice period, time-to-trial, post-judgment writ delay, mandatory mediation, right-to-counsel availability. Faster, cheaper, more landlord-favorable processes score lower; slower, more contested processes score higher.

8. Tenant organizing strength

Captures the practical capacity of local tenant-defense networks. Cities with funded right-to-counsel programs, active legal-aid presence, and organized tenant unions score higher because contested-case rates are higher and procedural defects more frequently produce dismissals.

9. Housing court bias

Reflects the procedural orientation of the local court. Courts with specialized housing dockets, mediation referral practices, and judges with published opinions interpreting tenant-protection statutes strictly score higher. Courts running pure default-judgment dockets score lower.

Historical reconstruction (1976–present)

Each city page resolves a 50-year series across all ten sub-scores. The continuous instrumental record is shallow – county eviction filings begin in 2000 and ACS estimates in 2005 – so the series joins a directly observed modern segment to a benchmark-anchored reconstruction of the earlier decades, scored through a single identical function end to end so every year is internally comparable.

Observed segment (2005–present). Computed directly from primary series: ACS 1- and 5-year estimates, MIT Election Lab county presidential margins, HUD Fair Market Rents, BLS shelter CPI, Eviction Lab filing rates, and state legislative records. Highest reliability.

Interpolated segment (1990–2004). Anchored to the 1990 and 2000 decennial Census and to dated statutory events (Costa-Hawkins 1995, NY Rent Regulation Reform Act 1997, Massachusetts Question 9 1994, state preemption by year), with covariates carried on documented state political control and national economic series.

Back-cast segment (1976–1989). Anchored to the 1980 decennial Census, documented rent-control effective dates (San Francisco 1979, Los Angeles 1978, Berkeley 1980, Oakland 1980, Santa Monica 1979, New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act 1974, New York ETPA 1974), state political control, and national economic indicators. These years are a modeled reconstruction under the current framework – the most defensible estimate of each market’s environment rather than a contemporaneous measurement – and carry the widest reliability band.

The chart encodes provenance directly: the observed segment is a solid full-color line, the interpolated segment is muted, and the back-cast segment is dashed with lighter markers, with each point’s reliability surfaced in its tooltip.

Data sources

Update cadence

Score recomputation runs quarterly when the Census Bureau releases new ACS 5-year estimate vintages. Legislative content reviews run continuously when state legislatures take action significant enough to shift a sub-factor weight. Every individual page carries a visible "last updated" timestamp on its written analysis.

Scope and interpretation

Three conditions govern how the score should be read.

Resolution. The eviction-difficulty axis resolves statutory structure precisely but not within-jurisdiction judicial variation: two judges in one county can return materially different timelines on identical facts. Court-level dynamics are documented narratively where our research team has direct operator experience.

Vintage. ACS 5-year estimates trail current conditions by roughly 18 to 30 months, so the fastest-moving rent markets are reflected with a lag; the vintage is stated on every page.

Use. The score is a market-research signal, not legal advice. Acquisition and operating decisions should pair it with jurisdiction-specific counsel admitted in the relevant state.

Reproducibility

The methodology is open. Underlying data is publicly available from the cited sources. Sub-factor weighting is documented above. If you need access to the raw scoring tables for academic or journalistic use, contact us via the address below.

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